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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
NATURAL GAS-LESSEE'S DEDICATION OF GAS TO THE INTERSTATE
MARKET BINDING ON THE REVERSIONARY INTEREST. California v.
Southland Royalty Co., 98 S. Ct. 1955 (1978).
Unprecedented escalations in the price of energy have stunned and
confused industrial, public, and federal regulatory sectors alike. Partic-
ular attention has focused on the gross disparity between controlled
prices in the interstate market and substantially higher uncontrolled
prices in the intrastate market.' This price discrepancy has created
some unique regulatory issues and answers. California v. Southland
Royalty Co.2 is but one example. In Southland, the United States
Supreme Court upheld a Federal Power Commission ruling that the
natural gas from leased property had been dedicated by the lessee to
the service of the interstate market.3 Once the gas had been dedicated,4
the Court concluded, the Commission had the statutory power under
the Natural Gas Act' to require the reversionary interest holder to ob-
tain the Commission's authorization to abandon interstate service of
gas, even though the lease had expired.6 This result in Southland, how-
ever, has been somewhat limited by the passage of the Natural Gas
Policy Act of 19787 This recent development will analyze the decision
in Southland and the effect of recent congressional action on its impor-
tance.
In 1925, Gulf Oil Corporation executed a lease under which it
1. See F.P.C. No. 770 (July 27, 1963), aFd.sub nom. American Public Gas Ass'n v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 555 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1976). It should be noted, however, that the reduction of
this disparity is a central purpose of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92
Stat. 3350 (1978).
2. 98 S. Ct. 1955 (1978).
3. 54 F.P.C. 2821 (1975). See 54 F.P.C. 145 (1975).
4. Dedication to the interstate market under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w
(1976) means to place the gas within the Federal Power Commission's jurisdiction. 98 S. Ct. at
1960. See note 10 infra.
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1976).
6. 98 S. Ct. at 1960.
7. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (1978).
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agreed to pay royalties to the lessor in return for the exclusive right to
produce and market oil and natural gas from the leased property for
fifty years.8 Some years later, Gulf contracted to sell natural gas to El
Paso Natural Gas Company, an interstate pipeline company.9 In con-
junction with this sale, Gulf obtained from the Federal Power Commis-
sion"0 a certificate of public convenience and necessity of unlimited
duration authorizing its interstate service." Shortly before the expira-
tion of the lease, Southland Royalty Company, the reversionary inter-
est holder,'2 arranged to sell the remaining natural gas at a higher price
to an intrastate producer.'3 El Paso, in order to preserve its source of
supply, sought a Federal Power Commission determination that the re-
maining natural gas could not be diverted from the interstate market
without the Commission's authorization to abandon the service.' 4
The Commission concluded that once the gas began to flow in in-
terstate commerce, Southland could not, upon termination of the lease,
sell gas in intrastate commerce without prior permission from the Com-
mission. ' The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, re-
8. 98 S. Ct. at 1957 & n.1. The lease involved in Southland was one with a fixed term. It
should be emphasized, however, that a fixed-term lease is not the type of lease normally used in
gas production. Rather, the typical lease includes a fixed primary term and a secondary term
which can extend the lease for an indefinite period of time. The lease is generally extended if
commercial production continues, or some other contractual provision is satisfied. Seegeneraly 3
H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 603-04 (1977).
9. 98 S. Ct. at 1957.
10. The Federal Power Commission is now called the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion.
11. 98 S. Ct. at 1957. Under § 7(e) of the Natural Gas Act, 5 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1976), a
permanent certificate is to be issued to an applicant if it is found that he is able and willing to
perform properly the service proposed and to conform to the Act and to Commission regulations.
Additionally, the proposed service or sale must be required by present or future public conven-
ience or by necessity. After the decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672
(1954), natural gas companies already supplying gas to the interstate market were required to
dedicate that gas to the interstate market by applying to the Federal Power Commission for ap-
proval of the service. Although the term "dedication" is not found within the Natural Gas Act, it
has been judicially defined. Some commentators believe that certification is not dedication, and
that dedication only arises upon commencement of service. See generally Conine & Niebrugge,
Dedication Under the Natural Gas Act: Extent and Escape, 30 OKLA. L. Rev. 375, 806 (1977).
12. Southland Royalty Company bought its reversionary interest in the mineral fee in 1926
from the lessor-owners of the property. At the time of the litigation, Southland Royalty Company
owned approximately 47% of the acreage involved. Trustees under the will of Warren Wright
owned 25.7%. Exxon Corporation owned 14%, and more than 100 other persons owned the re-
maining shares.
13. 98 S. Ct. at 1957.
14. Id.
15. 54 F.P.C. 145, 150 (1975). Section 7(b) of the Natural Gas Act states:
No gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the Commission, or any service rendered by means of such facilities, without the
permission and approval of the Commission first had and obtained, after due hearing,
2
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versed the Commission's decision. 6 The Fifth Circuit held that Gulf,
as a tenant for a term of years, could not legally dedicate to the inter-
state market the gas which Southland owned upon expiration of the
lease. 17
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court resolved this conflict
between basic property rights and regulatory power by affirming the
Commission's ruling.' 8 In support of its determination that South-
land's gas remained within the Commission's jurisdiction, the majority
opinion expoused three justifications: (1) the legislative purpose of the
Natural Gas Act; (2) the continuing nature of the federal obligation to
provide interstate service; and (3) the practical consequences of al-
lowing the expiration of a lease to terminate all obligation to the inter-
state market.
The majority found that the fundamental purpose of the Natural
Gas Act was "to assure an adequate and reliable supply of gas at rea-
sonable prices."' 9 To effect this end, the Court noted that the Commis-
sion was empowered with control over the terms on which service was
to be provided to the interstate market.2 ° Conversely, the Commission
had the authority to establish the conditions on which this interstate
service could cease.2 '
The majority opinion went on to discuss the continuing nature of
the obligation to serve the interstate market. Relying on the Court's
holding in Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. Federal Power
Commission,22 Justice White concluded that the obligation to serve at-
and a finding by the Commission that the available supply of gas is depleted to the extent
that the continuance of service is unwarranted, or that the present or future public con-
venience or necessity permit such abandonment.
15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1976). Once abandonment has been granted, however, the jurisdiction of the
Commission is terminated until some new jurisdiction-granting activity occurs. See Conine &
Niebrugge, Dedication Under the Natural Gas Act: Extent and Escape, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 735, 772-
73 (1977).
16. 543 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1976).
17. Id. at 1138. Judge Clark held that under Texas law a lessee under a 50 year fixed-term
lease did not have the power to dedicate to interstate commerce the gas remaining in the ground at
the expiration of the term. Under Texas law, the rights of the producer were those of a tenant for
a term of years, and were thereby restricted in scope and power to the limited term of the lease
under which they were created. Furthermore, the court of appeals held that the reversionary
interest holders acceptance of royalty payments during the term did not constitute a ratification of
the lessee's dedication of the gas to interstate commerce.
18. 98 S. Ct. 1955 (1978).
19. Id. at 1958 (citing Sunray Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 364 U.S.
137, 147 (1960) and Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 388 (1959)).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 364 U.S. 137 (1969). In Sunray, a producing company owned all the gas in controversy.
1978]
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tached to the gas as a matter of law and bound everyone with dominion
and power of sale over the gas, including the lessor to whom it re-
verted.2 3 Once gas began to flow in interstate commerce under a certifi-
cate of unlimited duration, the obligation could not be terminated by a
private lease arrangement. 24 Rather, only the Commission could au-
thorize an abandonment of service.25
In this regard, the majority rejected Southland's contention that no
man can dedicate to the interstate market what he does not own.26 The
Court held that dedication did not mean the surrender of the gas to the
public.27 Instead, dedication simply meant a change in the regulatory
status by placing the gas within the jurisdiction of the Commission.28
Finally, Justice White asserted that there could be "practical con-
sequences" for a "local economy which had grown dependent on natu-
ral gas as a' fuel" if the expiration of a lease to produce natural gas
terminated all obligations to serve the interstate market.29 Without the
continuation of this obligation after the lease term, producers and natu-
ral gas companies would be free to negotiate arrangements which could
frustrate the Natural Gas Act's ratemaking and supply goals.30  The
structure and purposes of the Natural Gas Act, therefore, required
broad authority for the Commission over the abandonment of inter-
state service.3'
It contracted with a interstate pipeline company to supply gas for a 20 year term. The producer
applied for a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Federal Power Commission
limited to the 20 year term. The Commission, however, issued a certificate of unlimited duration
pursuant to its recognized regulatory authority. Subsequently, Sunray commenced production
under the certificate. This commencement of service lead the Supreme Court to conclude the
unlimited certificate had been accepted. Because of the acceptance, the producer was held to have
undertaken a service obligation which survived the expiration of the contract term. Interstate
service, therefore, could not be abandoned without Commission approval. The Supreme Court
emphasized that the obligation imposed on the producer survived the contract term and was in
accordance with the purposes of the Natural Gas Act.
23. 98 S. Ct. at 1959.
24. Id.
25. Id. See note 15 supra.
26. 98 S. Ct. at 1960.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1961.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1962. The majority also concluded that the reversionaries were bound by the serv-
ice obligation because they had acquiesced in the lessee's action. The premise was based on the
notion that Southland could have objected to the dedication of the gas to interstate commerce at
the time Gulf applied for the certificate. Id. at 1960. Moreover, Southland ratified Gulfs action
by accepting royalties. Id. Finally, by implicitly authorizing Gulf to make interstate sales, the
reversionary interests knew that the gas would become subject to regulation and could not have
expected later sales of gas to be free from regulatory control. Id.
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The dissent argued that the majority's reliance on Sunray to justify
a broader view of the Commission's authority was misplaced.32 This
expansion of jurisdiction, Justice Stevens asserted, was inconsistent
with the purposes and structure of the Natural Gas Act. 33 Moreover, it
was argued that the majority's analysis ignored traditional property
concepts.34 To permit the Commission to retain jurisdiction over the
reversionary interest holder after the lease's expiration would be tanta-
mount to allowing the lessee to create an obligation binding on the
lessor that would endure beyond the lease term.35 The dissent, rather,
claimed that this radical change in the property interests relating to
natural gas was not what Congress intended in the Natural Gas Act. 36
Finally, Justice Stevens asserted that, contrary to the fears of the major-
ity, the long-term nature of natural gas development leases realistically
limited the ability of producers and gas companies to frustrate the Nat-
ural Gas Act's fundamental purpose of providing interstate service.37
Despite the holding in Southland, recent congressional action has
somewhat limited the impact of the decision. The House Report on the
National Gas Policy Act of 197838 specifically noted the circumstances
32. Id. at 1965-66. The dissent urged that there were key factual distinctions between Sunray
and Southland. They noted that in Southland there were essentially three parties: a lessor, a
producer, and a pipeline company. The lessor held the reversionary interest; while, the producer-
lessee dedicated the gas. In Sunray, on the other hand, there were only two parties, a producer
and a pipeline company. The producer who dedicated the gas owned the reversionary interest.
33. Id. at 1966. Citing Federal Power Comm'n v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S.
498, 502 (1948), the dissent emphasized that the Natural Gas Act did not represent a congressional
exercise of full power under the commerce clause of the Constitution. 98 S. Ct. at 1966.
34. Id. at 1967. The dissenting opinion stated that there is a "well-settled doctrine of prop-
erty law that 'one having a limited estate in land cannot, as against the person entitled in reversion
.... create an estate to endure beyond the normal time for termination of his own estate.' " Id.
(quoting I H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 153, at 247 (3d ed. 1939). The dissent
also argued that, contrary to the Commission's finding, Southland was not a successor-in-interest,
who took the property subject to burdens created by the lessee. 98 S. Ct. at 1966-67.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1968-69. There are few short-term development right leases in existence. See 3 H.
WILLIAM S & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 601.1-602.6 (1977); Walker, The Nature ofProp-
erty Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 7 Tax. L. REv. 1 (1928). The magnitude
of the capital investment required for exploration and development of oil and gas makes a short-
term lease extremely unattractive. Accordingly, this would dispell the notion that producers and
pipeline companies would agree to short-term leases as a means of frustrating the purposes of the
Natural Gas Act. The dissent also responded to the ratification argument of the majority by
stressing that the reversionaries lacked knowledge. Ratification, they noted, requires knowledg-
able choice. By accepting royalties during the term of its lease, Southland had committed no
action inconsistent with its reversionary right. The reversionary interests, therefore, had no
knowledge that receipt of royalties would be tantamount to ratification of the lessees action.
Moreover, reversionary interest holders had no legal right to interfere with or to control the
lessee's sale of gas during the lease term.
38. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (1978).
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of Southland and attempted to limit its further extension.39 Only natu-
ral gas which had been "dedicated to interstate commerce" prior to the
new act remains subject to the regulatory requirements of the Natural
Gas Act.n° Section 2(18)(B)(iii) of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
expressly excludes from the definition of "dedicated to interstate com-
merce" gas which would otherwise have been considered dedicated if
two requirements are met. First, a party, on May 31, 1978, must not
have had any right to explore for, to develop, to produce, or to sell the
gas from the property. Second, on May 31, 1978, the gas must not have
been sold in interstate commerce for resale.4 Therefore, if the gas was
not "dedicated" on May 31, 1978, any obligation to provide interstate
service would automatically end. Applying this exclusion, if a lessor
had no development rights and no gas was being sold in the interstate
market on May 31, 1978, the obligation to serve the interstate market
would be terminated. If, however, the lessor's reversionary interest
vested after May 31, 1978, the exclusion would not apply. Although
the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 would not have altered the result in
Southland, it does remove certain reversionary interest holders who ac-
quire their interests prior to May 31, 1978 from the Commission's juris-
diction.
Harley W. Thomas
39. H.R. REP. No. 1752, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 71, reprinted in [19791 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 9161, 9166.
40. Pub. L. No. 95-621, § 601(a), 92 Stat. 3409 (1978). Natural gas which remains committed
or dedicated to interstate commerce on the day before the date of enactment of the Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978, or which is not specifically exempted from the jurisdictional consequences of
commitment or dedication by the Act, remains subject to all the non-price regulatory require-
ments of the Natural Gas Act. An important aspect of continued Natural Gas Act regulation is
the requirement that a producer must still file an abandonment application with the Commission
before terminating services to the interstate market or before abandonment of facilities used for
interstate service.
41. Pub. L. No. 95-621, § 2(18)(B)(iii), 92 Stat. 3354 (1978).
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